"By violence and the sword, men's controversies are now decided"
How the successor to a popular Roman reformist brought norm-breaking further into the mainstream.
Welcome to the second chapter of The Unwritten Rules Break First. If you haven’t read the series introduction or the previous chapters, I highly recommend starting out there. They will help you acclimate to the fascinating world of Roman politics.
Gaius Gracchus was down but not out.
Though his brother had been killed and his faction scattered, Gaius still had the land commission his brother spearheaded. Some time after the 133 BCE affair, he began his work.
The Roman landscape had evolved since Tiberius’s death. Two of the three original land commissioners were dead—Tiberius went first, and Appius Claudius soon after.1 By 130, they were replaced by Fulvius Flaccus (who would be consul in 125 BCE) and Papirius Carbo (who would be consul in 120 BCE).
Flaccus was a staunch pro-Gracchan, as evidenced by his service on the land commission for nearly a decade. He was not only an astute politician but also an effective general, securing a triumph in his later years for defeating tribes in modern-day France.2 But he was a younger man now, not quite at the apex of his political career. He still had much life ahead of him, most of it at his friend Gaius’s side.
Less information exists about Carbo, though we know he was no less partisan. He sought to entrench Tiberius’s reforms by targeting the patronage system. Two years after the latter’s death, he proposed a measure as a tribune that introduced secret balloting to the Assembly. Every citizen would now vote in private stalls rather than out in the open, a practice central to democracy even today. However, this had the unintended consequence of upending class relations, a key pillar of Roman society. It would now be difficult, but not impossible, for political patrons to keep their clients in line. This was a very good development for lower-class and populist political candidates, who now saw a key obstacle to their success removed. 3
Gaius himself had come a long way since Tiberius’s ghost haunted him. He had become an excellent orator in his own right. Fiery and passionate, he was known to stir crowds with his animated speeches. He would often pace around the Forum’s speaking platform and whip himself up into a frenzy—only to be restrained by a nearby servant who constantly reminded Gaius to control his emotions. But Gaius’s zeal did not stop at the ballot box. He was quick to anger and could easily be overcome by rage. That said, he had a softer side—he loved his brother and was deeply impacted by his untimely death.4 It was at the confluence of these impulses that Gaius decided to continue his brother’s work.
Carbo planned to legitimize Tiberius’s actions in 133 by introducing another ballot measure that allowed tribunes to run for multiple terms. However, he was unsuccessful due to the skilled rhetoric of Scipio Aemilianus, consul and hero of Rome.
Aemilianus stands in stark relief from Gaius and his friends. Unlike them, he had decades of experience serving the Republic. Victorious against the Numantines and then Carthage, he was also a capable general and leader. Indeed, he was Tiberius Gracchus’s first military commander when he fought in the Third Punic War, and Gaius accompanied him when he returned to Spain in 134.5
But Aemilianus was a bit of a norm-breaker himself. Though he was under the consular age limit at the time, the Assembly made a special exception to elect him so in 148. In 134, partially due to the deteriorating situation in Spain, the people clamored again for Aemilianus to serve as consul. This was frowned upon by many institutionalists, but the Assembly made another exception, and Aemilianus was now a two-time consul.6
Originally, he and the Gracchi were on pleasant terms; Aemilianus helped Tiberius (his cousin) escape charges after the Numantine incident during the latter’s quaestorship.7 But his attitude quickly changed after Tiberius’s tribunate. In fact, he became so against his cousins that upon learning of Tiberius’s death while on campaign in Spain, Aemilianus quoted Homer and said, “So perish also all others who on such wickedness venture” (the title of our first chapter!).8
When Carbo introduced his term bill in 131, Aemilianus rose to argue against the proposal. But he shocked many when, in response to a pointed question by the tribune, he declared that Tiberius’s death was fair and legal if he had intended to overthrow the government. This remark irritated the population, and a few citizens began to heckle and interrupt him. Nevertheless, the Assembly was swayed and voted against Carbo’s bill—though it was clear Tiberius’s memory still held weight in the minds of many.9
The struggle repeated itself two years later with the land commission. Its three leaders had criss-crossed Italy by this time, handing out land parcels wherever they went. But they soon encountered multiple problems: a lack of written land deeds, blurred borders between public and private land, and boundary disputes between Rome and the Italian allies.10 These challenges threatened to hamper the commission’s work and limit the available land supply.
The Italians were particularly frustrated by the pesky commissioners because they believed it was a veiled attempt to limit their jurisdiction. If the commission chipped away at their land holdings, many reasoned, what would stop Rome from encroaching on other rights?
Irritated, many looked for a champion to rein in the commission. They found one in Scipio Aemilianus, who harkened back to Tiberius’s time by arguing that a consul would be better suited to handle these technically ‘international’ disputes. The Senate agreed and appointed consul Publius Sempronius Tuditanus to oversee the cases. But the lower classes were split on the decision. Many soured on Aemilianus, believing that he was placing foreign interests above their own. The pro-Gracchans encouraged these sentiments, spreading rumours that Aemilianus was desecrating Tiberius’s memory and plotting to scrap the popular commission altogether.11
As the debate intensified, Aemilianus prepared to deliver an address defending his position on the bill. It was one he never gave. The morning of the speech, Aemilianus did not emerge from his home. After a frantic search, he was discovered dead in his bed, stricken by an unknown ailment. Many ancient sources suspected foul play12, but modern historians cast doubt upon these assumptions. Because a resentful population prevented an impartial investigation, the true course of events is likely lost to history.13 One thing was for sure, though: Scipio Aemilianus, subduer of Carthage, was dead.
After Aemilianus’s death, some still looked for solutions to the impending crisis. Flaccus attempted to ram through a proposal granting citizenship to all Italians, but other elements of Roman society shot it down.14 Italian citizenship would have to wait.
In response, multiple Italian cities revolted against Roman control. Townships across the peninsula blazed with the fires of revolution. Levies were raised, and the fragile citizenship system seemed primed to collapse in Rome’s backyard. But the Republic had an ace up its sleeve: a little-known praetor named Lucius Opimius.
Opimius is the final actor in our story. He looms over the next five years like a dark cloud, constantly lurking in the shadows. Brutal and cold, he disregarded standard military procedures in favor of victory through fear.
The world got its first taste of Opimius’s philosophy during the brief Italian conflict. When the Senate assigned him to stop the revolts in 125, he executed their orders with ruthless efficiency. Besieging the rebellious city of Fregellae later that year, he breached its walls and razed everything to the ground. Almost no survivors were left behind. Though vicious, his strategy worked. The other Italian cities swiftly fell into line, and the nascent revolt was crushed.15
It was during this chaos that Gaius made his first foray into Republican politics. He took little part in the Italian debate, avoiding what could have been an early impediment to his career. Appointed quaestor in 126, the Senate assigned him to the province of Sardinia.16
It was not a good year to be in Sardinia. The winter was harsh, and the Roman garrison there was short on supplies. Their commander (a consul, Orestes) requested provisions from nearby cities, but Sardinian emissaries traveled to Rome and successfully convinced the Senate to annul the request. The Romans would not get their supplies. If the situation persisted, the troops would starve.
But now Gaius intervened. He was attached to Orestes’ command and saw firsthand the soldiers’ precarious situation—and decided to act. Making a circuit of the island later that year, he convinced several cities and towns to donate clothing to the army voluntarily. Additionally, he secured a donation of grain from King Micipsa of Numidia, a Roman ally in North Africa. Buoyed by his efforts, the garrison was able to last the winter.17
What Gaius experienced in 126 was likely an offshoot of a broader crisis facing the Republic. Ancient sources inform us that the following year (125, when Gaius’s friend Flaccus was a consul), a plague of locusts ravaged crops throughout North Africa, killing many citizens.18 This would have left Sicily as the sole grain-producing province left at the time, but we have no information on their yields. Given these facts, it’s quite possible that a massive grain shortage hit Rome in the mid-to-late 120s.19 So it wouldn’t have been too surprising for Gaius to consider grain distribution reforms before they became his calling card later in life.
The Senate subsequently decided to extend Orestes’s command an extra year in Sardinia. Plutarch writes that this was done to keep Gaius away from Roman politics, but it easily could have been to maintain continuity in a dire situation.20 Whatever the case, Gaius immediately left his post upon hearing the news and sailed straight for Rome.21
No one expected the quaestor’s arrival in 124. When he showed up in the Eternal City, the Senate immediately charged Gaius with dereliction of duty and of aiding the Italian rebellion in 125. But, buoyed by a warm reception from throngs of admirers, Gaius denied these accusations. The charges were eventually dropped, and Gaius felt free to continue his political career. He could now set his sights on his ultimate goal: the tribunate.22
Though his return impressed many ordinary citizens, Gaius’s situation was far from secure. Despite a spirited campaign, he only finished fourth in the tribunal elections for 123. This was enough to ensure victory, but dashed Gaius’s hopes for a landslide win.23 It did not take long, however, for him to shore up support among ordinary Romans.
One word was on Gaius’s lips throughout 123: reform. He passed a wide-ranging slate of bills that radically altered Roman society.
He first empowered the land commission to continue its work, allowing it to divide existing public land amongst the poor. This freed up more land for distribution, as before the commission could only distribute confiscated land.24
Gaius’s proposals also paved the way for substantial military improvements by obligating the state to pay for food, clothing, and equipment for all legionnaires.25 This change shifted the financial burden of warfare from the soldiers to the state, decoupling service in the legions from wealth. It started a series of events that culminated in the military abandoning land requirements less than half a century later.26 However, the ensuing influx of impoverished, glory-seeking soldiers would play a major role in the Republic’s final civil wars.
Gaius also introduced a bill proposing two new colonies (one of which was on the site of ruined Carthage), housing thousands of Roman colonists.27 This policy was specifically designed to maintain support among the poor and continue rebuilding the Roman middle class. This was among the most popular of Gaius’s reforms, as it gave non-landowners a chance to build wealth.28
To appease the equestrian class, Gaius initiated a radical judicial restructuring that rebalanced Roman class dynamics. The Extortion Court, long staffed exclusively by senators, had recently provoked ire by acquitting multiple magistrates of bribery charges. Many of the accused were themselves senators, leading to speculation about potential conflicts of interest. Pouncing on the subject, Gaius shifted the jury pool from senators to equestrians. This policy was less successful than the others, as the equestrian merchants also held conflicts of interest that enabled even more corruption than before.29
Finally, the centerpiece of Gaius’s reforms was a landmark grain distribution system likely inspired by his time in Sardinia. According to Gaius’s proposal, the Republic would now distribute cheap, state-purchased grain to all adult Roman citizens.30 To support this plan, Gaius also established a system of public granaries to store supplies.31 Once again, this proposal ushered in a new era of Roman politics, foreshadowing free grain distribution during the Roman Empire.
But not all of Gaius’s policies were noble. Bringing the state further into vendetta politics, Gaius also passed two laws targeting his late brother’s enemies.
The first law stipulated that if the Assembly stripped a magistrate of his office, they could not run again. This was specifically aimed at Octavius, Tiberius’s deposed foe from a decade earlier. In a remarkable display of political cunning, however, Gaius withdrew the bill after his mother supposedly ‘intervened’ in the situation. This display of filial piety only gave Gaius and his mother more support from the people.32
The second law obligated the government to prosecute past magistrates who banished Roman citizens without due process. Such a statute is known as an ex post facto law, targeting citizens who performed actions considered legal when they occurred. This law targeted another anti-Gracchan, known as Popilius, who, as praetor, banished many of Tibierius’s friends after his untimely death. Gaius kept this measure in place, and Popilius fled Italy.33
Gaius was able to pass many of these measures in part due to his strong public speaking skills. Many ancient historians considered him one of the greatest orators of his time. Even Cicero, a staunch institutionalist throughout the Republic’s final collapse, concurred with his peers that “[Gaius’s] language was noble; his sentiments manly and judicious; and his whole manner great and striking.”34
Taking a broader view of Gaius’s actions in 123, however, a more concerning pattern emerges. Many of Gaius’s laws undercut mos maiorum by harnessing state power for political purposes. Still, many of Gaius’s proposals appear intended to shift Roman politics from anti-Gracchan to pro-Gracchan arenas (especially the Assembly) instead of fundamentally altering the Republic.
When the elections for 122 rolled around at the end of the year, many believed Gaius would run for consul.35 He did not, though something far more unusual happened that year: there weren’t enough eligible candidates to fill ten tribunate positions. In a shocking twist, Gaius was allowed to fill one of the vacant spots even though he wasn’t a candidate.36 The bounds of mos maiorum stretched further, and Rome accepted the result without a sound. What was outrageous ten years ago became tolerable as Gaius settled into his second term.
Mandate in hand, Gaius continued to build his populist agenda. The centerpiece bill this year was another attempt at granting Italians citizenship. Yet again, however, the Senate intervened. As the vote drew near, the Senate decreed that all Italians must leave Rome until the Assembly voted on the proposal. Some anti-Gracchans also enlisted another tribune, Livius Drusus, to veto the bill.37
Drusus was a staunch ally of Gaius up until that point, which makes his defection all the more interesting. Given how little we know about the man, we will probably never know why he decided to switch sides. But the damage was done. Cracks were beginning to appear in the pro-Gracchan coalition, and the Italian bill failed to pass.
These fissures continued to grow throughout 122. Drusus proposed a populist agenda that outdid Gaius: establishing twelve new colonies instead of two, allowing poor people to receive public land for free, and forbidding torture of Italian allies. In an instant, Gaius’s base evaporated—and Drusus was in control.38
Escaping the crisis, Gaius left for North Africa with his old friend Flaccus, who moved down the cursus honorum to become a tribune in 122 in another major breach of mos maiorum.39 While there, both men visited Roman Carthage and observed the rapid construction of Gaius’s pet project.
There was one major problem with building on Carthage’s ruins, however. When Scipio Aemilianus destroyed the old city 25 years earlier, he swore a religious oath that no one would ever develop on the site. While construction progressed smoothly as the Romans set the city limits, strange events soon began to occur. A fierce gust of wind destroyed the city's standard. A hurricane hit the area. Wolves tore up the colony’s boundary markers.40 All of this was quite concerning to the notoriously superstitious Romans. Some felt that the gods were displeased with Gaius’s actions, and citizens continued to turn against him.
Gaius, realizing the severity of his situation upon returning to Rome, took matters into his own hands by portraying himself as a champion of the common man. He moved into a small house by the Forum. He confiscated senatorial luxury boxes at gladiator fights (which backfired and turned the remaining wealthy pro-Gracchans against him).41 He ran for tribune again for 121. But by now, the anti-Gracchans were too strong. Gaining momentum, they annulled his candidacy on procedural grounds and helped elect Lucius Opimius, the sacker of Fregellae and avowed anti-Gracchan, consul.42 If there were any unrest in 121, Opimius would certainly put it down.
Firmly in power, the anti-Gracchans laid a trap. They attempted to bait Gaius into a conflict with a two-pronged strategy: repeal his laws in the Assembly and revoke authorization for Roman Carthage in the Senate. It worked. Gaius, furious, rallied a mob and led them into the Capitol to protest the bill. Just as it appeared a fight would break out, however, Gaius retreated to a nearby portico to surveil the scene.43
It was customary for the Senate to perform a sacrifice before opening proceedings. This was what Gaius witnessed when he first arrived on the scene. But one of the servants assigned to the ceremony, Antyllus, spied Gaius upon leaving the Senate building and walked over to him. Sources diverge on what Antyllus said, but the result was the same: Gaius gave a shocked or scornful look toward the man, and a group of pro-Gracchans immediately fell upon him with makeshift knives.44 Antyllus was dead in seconds. Mob violence had returned to Rome.
This was not Gaius’s intention, of course. Multiple ancient sources note that Gaius was disturbed upon understanding what had happened and scolded his followers for giving his opponents ammunition to attack his cause.45 But it was too late. Gaius spoke to the Senate and attempted to absolve himself of responsibility, but it was no use. No one would listen to him. Dejected, Gaius and Flaccus retreated to their homes, unsure of what to do next.
In an extraordinary session the following day, the Senate proclaimed the senatus consultum ultimum—a novel decree commanding consul Opimius to do everything necessary to preserve the Republic. It was, in effect, a declaration of martial law. Opimius gathered a group of armed men and camped in the Capitol, preparing for violence.46
Now events were moving beyond Gaius’s control. A group of pro-Gracchan partisans seized one of Rome’s seven hills (the Aventine). Flaccus and Gaius attempted to gather support among the slaves by promising their freedom, but attracted no one. They joined their supporters on the Aventine and took up defensive positions.47
Looking for a way out of the situation, the pro-Gracchans sent one of Flaccus’s sons, Quintus, to determine the Senate’s position. Upon his arrival, Opimius and the Senate responded that they would not negotiate unless Gaius and Flaccus came in person. If more pro-Gracchan messengers attempted to negotiate, Opimius added, he would immediately detain them. 48 Gaius and his friends disagreed on what to do next. Gracchus thought he could go and convince the Senate to end the struggle peacefully, but his friends wanted to fight. Outnumbered, Gaius caved. He would stay.49
In a last-ditch attempt to avert catastrophe, the pro-Gracchans sent Quintus Flaccus back to the Senate. But when he arrived, Opimius held fast to his promise and arrested him on the spot.50 There would be no more negotiations. Opimius sent his military force towards the Aventine. The bloodshed would begin shortly.
It wasn’t a fair fight. Opimius used his archers to devastating effect, sowing confusion within the armed mob. Then, his infantry advanced through the streets and picked off pro-Gracchan partisans.51 Resistance melted away. Flaccus took shelter in a nearby blacksmith’s shop. Gaius, meanwhile, sprained his ankle while attempting to escape the city and trudged on.52
It didn’t take long for Opimius to find the ring-leaders. Flaccus was pulled from his hidey-hole, betrayed by a neighbor. Gaius, upon realizing he couldn’t escape, asked his faithful servant Philocrates to stab him.53 He bled out in a garden outside of Rome’s walls. Just like his vision foretold, Gaius couldn’t escape a violent death.
In the days following Gaius’s demise, Opimius executed a vicious purge that took the lives of 3,000 pro-Gracchan partisans. Even poor Quintus Flaccus, messenger of the mob, was only afforded the dignity of choosing his manner of death.54 Gaius and Flaccus were dumped into the Tiber: those who delivered their heads to the Senate were paid their weight in gold.55
Such was the life of Gaius Gracchus: more expansive, populist, and violent than his brother’s. While he introduced many long-term reforms that benefited the Republic, his precedent-breaking actions contributed to a factional race for popular support, violence within Rome’s city limits, and a rise in vendetta politics.
Gaius’s greatest legacy was a continued breakdown of class relations and mos maiorum. Concerningly, we see that most people didn’t seem to mind when Gaius ran for a second and third term as tribune—a stark departure from Tiberius’s time a decade prior. People were beginning to internalize social breaches as ordinary, disregarding their previous reverence for unwritten norms. With this new framework in place, Roman politicians had a road map for pushing the bounds of mos maiorum: build upon past breakdowns and see how far they could go. This strategy would be exploited to devastating effect by future figures leveraging the Gracchi’s exploits, especially the showman-politician Lucius Appuleius Saturninus two decades later.
In leveraging the state’s authority to pursue political opponents, Gaius also set a dangerous precedent. In theory, anyone in power with a grudge could follow his example and pass laws indirectly targeting their enemies, using the legal process as cover to stifle dissent.
Beyond breaking political norms, Gaius also upended social structures. His bid to influence the Extortion Court sparked a decades-long cycle of reform and counter-reform, with control shifting between the Senate and the equestrians.
At this point, we have seen two types of politicians in Ancient Rome: those who harness the people’s power to enact popular proposals (populist reformers) and those who saw these reformers as a threat to the Republic (institutionalists). These respective approaches would clash continuously during the Late Republic, and eventually led to its downfall. But it was during the Gracchi brothers’ time that these fault lines first emerged.
A new religious structure was built in the months after Gaius’s death. It was called the Temple of Concord, dedicated to the unity and strength of the Roman people. But those who witnessed the violence of 121 knew better. They knew it was only a matter of time before everything would come crashing down. So it was no surprise that, some time after its dedication, an inscription was found on the temple’s base. It read:
“A work of mad discord produces a temple of Concord.”56
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App., The Civil Wars i.iii.18
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 18.1; DeGrassi, Fasti Triumphales (pg. 105)
Yakobson, Alexander. “Secret Ballot and Its Effects in the Late Roman Republic.” Hermes 123, no. 4 (1995): 426–42. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4477105.
Plut., The Life of Tiberius Gracchus 2.2-2.5
Scullard, H.H. "Scipio Africanus the Younger." Encyclopedia Britannica, April 8, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Scipio-Africanus-the-Younger.
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.19; Aur. Victor, De Viris Illustribus 58; Livy, Periochae 50 + 56; Vell. Paterculus, The Roman History ii.4.2
Plut., The Life of Tiberius Gracchus 7.1
Plut., The Life of Tiberius Gracchus 21.4
Livy, Periochae 59.11; Plut., The Life of Tiberius Gracchus 21.5
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.18
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.19
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.20; Aur. Victor, De Viris Illustribus 58; Livy, Periochae 59; Oro., The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans v.10.9; Vell. Paterculus, The Roman History ii.4.5-ii.4.7
Beness, J. Lea. “Scipio Aemilianus and the Crisis of 129 B.C.” Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte 54, no. 1 (2005): 37–48. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436754.
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.21; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 10.3
Livy, Periochae 60; Vell. Paterculus, The Roman History ii.6.4
Aur. Victor, De Viris Illustribus 65; Dio. xxxiv/xxxv.24; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 2.1
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 2.2-2.3
Livy, Periochae 60; Oro., The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans v.11
Garnsey, Peter, and Dominic Rathbone. “The Background to the Grain Law of Gaius Gracchus.” The Journal of Roman Studies 75 (1985): 20–25. https://doi.org/10.2307/300649.
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 2.3
Dio. xxxiv/xxxv.24; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 2.4
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 3.1
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 3.2
Livy, Periochae 60; Oro., The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans v.12.4; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 5.1; Vell. Paterculus, The Roman History ii.6.3
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 5.1
Gabba, Emilio, and P.J. Cuff. “The Origins of the Professional Army at Rome: The ‘Proletarii’ and Marius’ Reform.” In Republican Rome: The Army and the Allies, 1st ed., 1–19. University of California Press, 1976. http://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.5233031.4.
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.23.1; Livy, Periochae 60; Oro., The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans v.12.1; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 6.3;
As evidenced by the fact that Drusus’s plan for twelve new colonies significantly diminished Gaius’s support.
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.22; Dio. xxxiv/xxxv.25; Vell. Paterculus, The Roman History ii.6.3
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.21; Livy, Periochae 60; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 5.2; Vell. Paterculus, The Roman History ii.6.3
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 6.3
Dio. xxxiv/xxxv.25.2; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 4
Dio. xxxiv/xxxv.26; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 4.2
Cic., Brutus 124-126
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 8.1
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.21; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 8.2
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.23; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 5.1; Vell. Paterculus, The Roman History ii.6.2
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.23; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 9.2-9.4
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.24
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.24; Oro., The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans v.12.2; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 11.1
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 12
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 12.4-13.1
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.24-i.iii.25; Aur. Victor, De Viris Illustribus 65; Flor. The Epitome of Roman History ii.3.15.4; Oro., The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans v.12.5; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 13.3
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.25; Aur. Victor, De Viris Illustribus 65; Oro., The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans v.12.5; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 13.3-13.4
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.25; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 13.4
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.25; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 14.3
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.26; Aur. Victor, De Viris Illustribus 65; Flor. The Epitome of Roman History ii.3.15.5; Livy, Periochae 61;
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.26; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 16.1-16.2
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 16.3
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.26; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 16.3
Oro., The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans v.12.7; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 16.4
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.26; Aur. Victor, De Viris Illustribus 65; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 17.1
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.26; Aur. Victor, De Viris Illustribus 65; Dio. xxxiv/xxxv.29; Oro., The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans v.12.8; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 17.2; Val. Maximus, Memorable Deeds and Sayings 6.viii.8.3; Vell. Paterculus, The Roman History ii.6.6
App., The Civil Wars i.iii.26; August., De civ. D. iii.24; Oro., The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans v.12.9-v.12.10; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 18.1;
Aur. Victor, De Viris Illustribus 65; August., De civ. D. 24; Dio. xxxiv/xxxv.29; Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 17.4-17.5; Vell. Paterculus, The Roman History ii.6.5
Plut., The Life of Gaius Gracchus 17.6